Securing Your Edge Computing Gateway at Deployment

Securing Your Edge Computing Gateway at Deployment

The deployment checklist

If you do only one thing: decide whether this device needs automatic USB updates. If not, leave the path off.

1
Control the USB update path
Leave it off unless you service by USB.
2
Treat physical access as security
Site security is device security.
3
Know your hardware
Secure Boot is one-way.
4
Keep the device patched
5
Plan for shared identity
If you deploy from a golden image.
6
Standard hygiene
Unique credentials, minimal exposure, periodic review.

RobustOS Pro ships with its core protections already on: firmware updates are signature-verified before they install, the automatic USB update path is switched off by default, and the device recovers from boot failures automatically. What remains is a short list of deployment-time steps that put the controls — literally — in your hands.

If you do only one thing
Decide whether this device needs automatic USB updates — and if it doesn't, leave that path switched off. It ships off by default.
1
Control the USB update path
It ships off by default. Leave it off unless you service by USB — and if you do, change the shared default key from the command line.
2
Treat physical access as security
USB paths and the RST button need hands on the device — site security is device security.
3
Know your hardware; Secure Boot is one-way
A fitted TPM 2.0 chip is not used by today's firmware. Verified boot is a state the device is put into — permanent once locked, and signing your own images is a future capability.
4
Keep the device patched
Firmware updates do not remove what you installed; subscribe to security announcements.
5
Plan for shared identity if you deploy from a golden image
A clone carries host keys, certificates and credentials — every unit built from it shares them.
6
Standard operational hygiene
Unique credentials, minimal interface exposure, periodic fleet review.
The deployment checklist at a glance — each step is a chapter below.

1 · Control the USB update path

A prepared stick can update a device with no one logged in. It is off by default, and that is the safe state.

Not servicing by USB?
Confirm Enable Automatic Upgrade is off (Interface → USB → USB), or disable USB entirely.
Leave it off
Servicing by USB?
Replace the shared default key from the command line, then Generate the matching key file.
Change the default key
Proof 1 · built in
The signature check proves what the package is: genuine Robustel firmware.
Proof 2 · you set it
Your USB key proves who is holding the stick.
Missing with the default key
Generate only exports the key file. The key value itself is changed from the command line. Changing it does not affect recovery by image flashing.

What it is. RobustOS Pro devices can be updated from a USB stick: a stick prepared with the device’s USB key file can apply a RobustOS Pro firmware or app package, import a configuration, or restore a clone package — automatically, without anyone logging in. This is a deliberate field-service feature: a technician can service a device without credentials being shared. Whether it is active is a setting you control (Interface → USB → USB → Enable Automatic Upgrade).

What this path can reach. A clone package is a complete software state, not a settings file — so a clone restored from a stick can replace the base operating system too, when the clone carries a different version. That is the measure of what the USB key stands in front of.

A separate path, with a separate control. USB image flashing — a fresh base OS install, or last-resort recovery — does not use the USB key at all. It is a physical-access operation; see step 2. Everything in this section is about the keyed update path — Updating Your Device sets out all three things the USB port does.

It is off by default — and that is the safe state. On a factory-default device, USB automatic upgrade is disabled: inserting a prepared stick does nothing until you enable it. If you do not service this device by USB, leave the path off — or disable USB entirely on the same page. Nothing on the USB update path can run while it is disabled.

If you do use the USB update path, change the shared default key. The key that unlocks this path is a factory default — and the default is the same on every unit. While the path is enabled, a stick prepared with that default key can apply firmware, import configuration, or restore a clone package on any device still carrying it. The signature check does not close this gap: it proves a firmware package genuinely comes from Robustel — what the package is — not that the person holding it is authorized. The USB key is what proves that, and until you replace the default, that proof is missing.

Changing the key is a command-line step. In the Web UI, Interface → USB → Key offers only a Generate button — it exports the key file that matches the key the device currently holds; it does not set a new key, and there is no field to type one in. To replace the key value, change it from the device command line (root access), then use Generate to produce the matching key file for your service sticks.

Proof 1 · Built in
Signature check
Proves what the package is — a firmware package is verified as genuine Robustel software before it installs.
+
Proof 2 · You set it
Your USB key
Proves who is holding the stick — a stick prepared with your key, not a stranger's.
Both proofs ✓Genuine firmware package, and your stick
Default key ✗Proof 2 is missing — while the path is on, any default-keyed stick is accepted
Both proofs are needed — a factory-default key leaves the second one missing.

What to do:

  • If this device is not updated by USB, confirm the USB update path is off — disable Enable Automatic Upgrade (Interface → USB → USB), or disable USB entirely. On a factory-default unit it is already off; make confirming it part of your provisioning checklist.
  • If this device is updated by USB, replace the shared default key from the command line, then use Generate to export the matching key file from Interface → USB → Key. Treat that key like a credential: store it with your deployment secrets, and never ship a serviced unit still carrying the default.
  • Changing the key does not disable USB updating — your own sticks, prepared with your key, keep working. And because USB image flashing does not use the key, a key change does not affect your ability to recover a device.
Web UIInterface → USB → Key
Drop a screenshot of the USB key settings
Interface → USB → Key exports the key file that matches the device's current key — Generate only exports it; the key value itself is changed from the command line.

2 · Treat physical access as security

The most powerful operations need hands on the device. Remote attackers cannot reach them.

Know who has access
Restrict it where you can.
Know what RST restores
On a unit carrying a custom factory image, it restores that image.
Image flashing has no key
Physical control of the device is what protects that path.

The most powerful operations on a RobustOS Pro device are the physical ones: the USB paths and the RST recovery button all require hands on the device. That is a protection — remote attackers cannot reach them — but it means site security is device security:

  • Know who has physical access to your devices, and restrict it where you can.
  • Know what the RST button restores on your units — on a unit carrying a custom factory image, it restores that image (see When Something Goes Wrong).
  • Combine this with step 1: on the update path, a changed USB key is what stands between a stranger’s stick and a default-keyed device. On the image-flashing path there is no key to change, and the image’s signature is checked only when a signature file is supplied with it — nothing requires one. Physical control of the device is what protects that path. On devices provisioned for verified boot (step 3), the device still boots Robustel-signed software only.

3 · Know your hardware; Secure Boot is one-way

Two different hardware features. Which one applies, if either does, depends on the device.

TPM 2.0 chip
Fitted on some devices. Today's firmware does not use it.
Not used today
Verified boot and encrypted storage
On devices provisioned for it: boot software and OS verified at every start; storage encrypted.
Permanent once locked
No unlock, no override, no reset. On 2.4.x the device boots Robustel-signed software only. Treat enabling it as a deliberate, documented step.

Two different hardware security features can be involved here. They are not the same thing and they are not interchangeable — which one applies, if either does, depends on the device you have.

A hardware security chip (TPM 2.0). Some RobustOS Pro devices are built with one — check your device's specifications. Today's firmware does not use it. Nothing installed on the device uses it; putting it to work on 2.4.x means writing your own software against the chip. Firmware support is planned.

Verified boot and encrypted storage. On devices provisioned for it, the device verifies its boot software and operating system against a cryptographic key at every start, and the writable storage is encrypted with a key bound to that device's hardware. It is a state the device is put into, not an option you order.

Two things to know before a device is put into that state:

  • It is permanent. Once the security fuses are locked, the device only ever boots correctly signed software. There is no unlock, no override, no reset. This is the guarantee working as designed.
  • What it verifies today. On 2.4.x, the verified-boot chain uses Robustel-signed boot software — the device boots Robustel-signed software only. From RobustOS Pro 2.5.0, signing your own system image and locking the device to your key is available: see Signing Your Own Image. Because enabling Secure Boot is irreversible, treat it as a deliberate, documented step and follow the enablement procedure exactly.

4 · Keep the device patched

Installed packages are not removed by a standard firmware update. Check their versions after the first update of a release.

The device never creates a backup itself.
Robustel knowledge base, and RCMS for managed fleets.
Report vulnerabilities
Robustel Security Centre: acknowledged within 7 calendar days.
  • Keep the device patched. Debian packages you install are not removed by a standard firmware update. After the first update of a new release, confirm the packages you patched are still at the versions you expect — What an Update Changes explains why that check is worth making.
  • Back up before every change. The device never creates a backup automatically; your last manual backup is your rollback point. For a copy that leaves the device, create a clone package and write it to external storage (see Updating Your Device) — and store it as carefully as you store credentials — it contains your device's configuration and software state.
  • Subscribe to updates. Security updates are announced through the Robustel knowledge base (subscribe at Robustel.com) and are visible through RCMS for managed fleets.
  • Report suspected vulnerabilities through the Robustel Security Centre (robustel.com/security-centre). The published commitments: reports acknowledged within 7 calendar days; Critical vulnerabilities assessed within 3 days and fixed within 14; High vulnerabilities assessed within 5 days and fixed within 30.

5 · Golden image? Plan for shared identity

Every unit built from the same clone shares its host keys, certificates and credentials.

Decide which identity must be unique; install it after restore.
The clone becomes the factory baseline
A factory reset returns to the clone, credentials included.
Match the hardware exactly
Same model, same hardware variant, memory included.
Treat it as a credential store
Not on the USB stick that travels between sites.

Building one device the way you want it, taking a clone package off it, and installing that on the rest of the fleet is the practical way to deploy at volume — and it is what Robustel Technical Support pre-installs during manufacturing if you send them the package.

Be aware of what travels with it:

  • A clone carries the device's identity material — SSH host keys, TLS/SSL certificates, VPN credentials and cloud or application identifiers. Every unit built from the same golden image shares all of them.
  • Plan the re-issue. Decide before deployment which of those must be unique per device, and generate or install them as a post-restore step. Host keys and client certificates are the usual candidates.
  • The clone becomes the factory baseline. After it is installed, a factory reset returns the device to the clone — not to a clean out-of-the-box state. If the clone carries credentials, a reset restores them rather than clearing them.
  • Match the hardware exactly. A clone restores only onto the same model and the same hardware variant, memory configuration included.
  • Treat the package as a credential store. Keep it with your deployment secrets, and do not leave it on the USB stick that travels between sites.

6 · Standard operational hygiene

The baseline for any industrial device applies here too.

Unique administrator credentialsWeb UI and SSH only where neededPeriodic fleet review

These are not product-specific — they are the baseline for any industrial device, and they apply here too:

  • Use strong, unique administrator credentials on every device; never share credentials across sites.
  • Expose the management interfaces (Web UI, SSH) only to networks that need them.
  • Review your fleet periodically: firmware versions, patch state, and who holds the USB keys and backups.
What an Update Changes
What updates and resets do to your device.
When Something Goes Wrong
Recovering a device that will not boot.
Updating Your Device
How to perform updates, including by USB.

What this guide does not cover

Next · step 6 of 13Signing your own image →Lock a device to a system image you signed yourself (2.5.0 and later).