If you do only one thing: decide whether this device needs automatic USB updates. If not, leave the path off.
1 Control the USB update path Leave it off unless you service by USB. | 2 Treat physical access as security Site security is device security. | 3 Know your hardware Secure Boot is one-way. |
5 Plan for shared identity If you deploy from a golden image. | 6 Standard hygiene Unique credentials, minimal exposure, periodic review. |
RobustOS Pro ships with its core protections already on: firmware updates are signature-verified before they install, the automatic USB update path is switched off by default, and the device recovers from boot failures automatically. What remains is a short list of deployment-time steps that put the controls — literally — in your hands.
| 1 | Control the USB update path It ships off by default. Leave it off unless you service by USB — and if you do, change the shared default key from the command line. |
| 2 | Treat physical access as security USB paths and the RST button need hands on the device — site security is device security. |
| 3 | Know your hardware; Secure Boot is one-way A fitted TPM 2.0 chip is not used by today's firmware. Verified boot is a state the device is put into — permanent once locked, and signing your own images is a future capability. |
| 4 | Keep the device patched Firmware updates do not remove what you installed; subscribe to security announcements. |
| 5 | Plan for shared identity if you deploy from a golden image A clone carries host keys, certificates and credentials — every unit built from it shares them. |
| 6 | Standard operational hygiene Unique credentials, minimal interface exposure, periodic fleet review. |
A prepared stick can update a device with no one logged in. It is off by default, and that is the safe state.
Not servicing by USB? Confirm Enable Automatic Upgrade is off (Interface → USB → USB), or disable USB entirely. Leave it off | Servicing by USB? Replace the shared default key from the command line, then Generate the matching key file. Change the default key |
Proof 1 · built in The signature check proves what the package is: genuine Robustel firmware. | Proof 2 · you set it Your USB key proves who is holding the stick. Missing with the default key |
What it is. RobustOS Pro devices can be updated from a USB stick: a stick prepared with the device’s USB key file can apply a RobustOS Pro firmware or app package, import a configuration, or restore a clone package — automatically, without anyone logging in. This is a deliberate field-service feature: a technician can service a device without credentials being shared. Whether it is active is a setting you control (Interface → USB → USB → Enable Automatic Upgrade).
What this path can reach. A clone package is a complete software state, not a settings file — so a clone restored from a stick can replace the base operating system too, when the clone carries a different version. That is the measure of what the USB key stands in front of.
A separate path, with a separate control. USB image flashing — a fresh base OS install, or last-resort recovery — does not use the USB key at all. It is a physical-access operation; see step 2. Everything in this section is about the keyed update path — Updating Your Device sets out all three things the USB port does.
It is off by default — and that is the safe state. On a factory-default device, USB automatic upgrade is disabled: inserting a prepared stick does nothing until you enable it. If you do not service this device by USB, leave the path off — or disable USB entirely on the same page. Nothing on the USB update path can run while it is disabled.
If you do use the USB update path, change the shared default key. The key that unlocks this path is a factory default — and the default is the same on every unit. While the path is enabled, a stick prepared with that default key can apply firmware, import configuration, or restore a clone package on any device still carrying it. The signature check does not close this gap: it proves a firmware package genuinely comes from Robustel — what the package is — not that the person holding it is authorized. The USB key is what proves that, and until you replace the default, that proof is missing.
Changing the key is a command-line step. In the Web UI, Interface → USB → Key offers only a Generate button — it exports the key file that matches the key the device currently holds; it does not set a new key, and there is no field to type one in. To replace the key value, change it from the device command line (root access), then use Generate to produce the matching key file for your service sticks.
Proof 1 · Built in Signature check Proves what the package is — a firmware package is verified as genuine Robustel software before it installs. | + | Proof 2 · You set it Your USB key Proves who is holding the stick — a stick prepared with your key, not a stranger's. |
Both proofs ✓Genuine firmware package, and your stick | Default key ✗Proof 2 is missing — while the path is on, any default-keyed stick is accepted |
What to do:
The most powerful operations need hands on the device. Remote attackers cannot reach them.
Know who has access Restrict it where you can. | Know what RST restores On a unit carrying a custom factory image, it restores that image. | Image flashing has no key Physical control of the device is what protects that path. |
The most powerful operations on a RobustOS Pro device are the physical ones: the USB paths and the RST recovery button all require hands on the device. That is a protection — remote attackers cannot reach them — but it means site security is device security:
Two different hardware features. Which one applies, if either does, depends on the device.
TPM 2.0 chip Fitted on some devices. Today's firmware does not use it. Not used today | Verified boot and encrypted storage On devices provisioned for it: boot software and OS verified at every start; storage encrypted. Permanent once locked |
Two different hardware security features can be involved here. They are not the same thing and they are not interchangeable — which one applies, if either does, depends on the device you have.
A hardware security chip (TPM 2.0). Some RobustOS Pro devices are built with one — check your device's specifications. Today's firmware does not use it. Nothing installed on the device uses it; putting it to work on 2.4.x means writing your own software against the chip. Firmware support is planned.
Verified boot and encrypted storage. On devices provisioned for it, the device verifies its boot software and operating system against a cryptographic key at every start, and the writable storage is encrypted with a key bound to that device's hardware. It is a state the device is put into, not an option you order.
Two things to know before a device is put into that state:
Installed packages are not removed by a standard firmware update. Check their versions after the first update of a release.
The device never creates a backup itself. | Robustel knowledge base, and RCMS for managed fleets. | Report vulnerabilities Robustel Security Centre: acknowledged within 7 calendar days. |
Every unit built from the same clone shares its host keys, certificates and credentials.
Decide which identity must be unique; install it after restore. | The clone becomes the factory baseline A factory reset returns to the clone, credentials included. | Match the hardware exactly Same model, same hardware variant, memory included. |
Treat it as a credential store Not on the USB stick that travels between sites. |
Building one device the way you want it, taking a clone package off it, and installing that on the rest of the fleet is the practical way to deploy at volume — and it is what Robustel Technical Support pre-installs during manufacturing if you send them the package.
Be aware of what travels with it:
The baseline for any industrial device applies here too.
Unique administrator credentialsWeb UI and SSH only where neededPeriodic fleet review
These are not product-specific — they are the baseline for any industrial device, and they apply here too:
What an Update Changes What updates and resets do to your device. | When Something Goes Wrong Recovering a device that will not boot. | Updating Your Device How to perform updates, including by USB. |
| Next · step 6 of 13Signing your own image →Lock a device to a system image you signed yourself (2.5.0 and later). |